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The Helmets May Be Blue,
But the Blood's Still Red:

The Dilemma of US Participation
in UN Peace Operations

Advanced Studies Essay

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The Helmets May Be Blue, But The Blood's Still Red: The Dilemma of US Participation in UN Peace Operations

Introduction

The end of the Cold War compelled the United States to initiate a fundamental reassessment of the decision-making frameworks it had adopted to formulate and implement foreign and national security policies. This "starting from zero" approach was necessitated by discontinuities in Washington's objectives, strategies, and instruments for international relations created by the passing of the Cold War.¹ An example of the changing patterns of international behavior in the "new world order" was the sudden prominence of United Nations (UN) peace operations.² A seldom used tool of collective action under the UN aegis historically, only 13 operations were established between 1948 and 1978, and no new missions were initiated during the subsequent decade.³ Peace operations during this period occupied a minor place in America's world policy agenda because of the lack of significant United States (US) participation in them, and Washington's overriding preoccupation with its geostrategic competition against the USSR, in which peace operations played a largely peripheral role.⁴

All of that changed with the end of the Cold War. Freed from the paralysis of the US-USSR stand-off and rocked by the eruption of violence that accompanied the collapse of enforced stability within the Soviet Union and the geographic areas it controlled, the UN gained new importance in global peace and security matters.⁵ One element was the proliferation of UN peace operations. Twenty have been established by the UN Security Council since 1988 -- a record number -- virtually all of which are still active.⁶ Peace operations are generally acknowledged to operate as an instrument that facilitates both a cessation of violence between contesting parties and the settlement of their dispute. The growing use of this technique to peacefully resolve conflict in contemporary international affairs, however, has raised significant problems for the United States in establishing policies that will govern its role in such actions.⁷

This study is intended to examine several key contentious elements in ongoing US deliberations over participating in UN peace operations.⁸ It addresses national security issues the United States confronts in establishing a policy on peace operations in today's world, and it looks at the importance of this policy on Washington's overall efforts to secure its national interests in the post-Cold War era.⁹ After examining these issues, it offers specific recommendations that

address some of the problems that are preventing a decision on the US role in peace operations. Although, by itself, this paper will not end the debate over peace operations, it will offer a constructive start toward understanding the complexities that attend this debate and ways to achieve progress in reaching a decision. Practical concerns associated with the actual conduct of peace operations, such as command and control issues, will not be examined. While they are obviously important, this paper instead assesses the US role in peace operations as a policy issue for officials who are attempting to fashion US national security policy for contemporary international politics.

The Peace Operation Dilemma

Despite having become a salient feature of post-Cold War international efforts to quell violence in world politics, peace operations remain remarkably obscure to most Americans. Indeed, part of the ongoing US policy debate on peace operations arises from competing, and at times conflicting, beliefs about them. The absence of clearly applicable concepts and measures to define and evaluate peace operations also contributes to the ambiguity that surrounds their relationship to US national security policy. By examining the nature of peace operations and their place in securing US global interests, the inherent benefits and costs they offer to the furtherance of US interests in the international system can be better understood.

The Nature of Peace Operations

Considerable confusion about the peace operations is caused by the fact that numerous terms exist under this rubric to describe overlapping, albeit separate, activities that are part of the overall UN program to help resolve conflict and maintain global peace and security. The use of "peace operations" to encompass all of these actions is premised on the fact that the terms that have been created to identify major categories of action all contain the word "peace". Some of the terms that have appeared prominently in the parlance of peace operations are peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peacemaking, and peace-building.¹⁰ Multiple definitions, some quite elaborate, have been offered for each of these terms. Recognizing their variety and complexity, some authors have used a functional approach to define these terms, preferring to rely on a description of associated activities rather than an explanation of underlying principles.¹¹

Individual differences between existing definitions are not as important as the fact that the presence of multiple interpretations indicates that considerable ambiguity exists--on both an

individual and comparative basis--regarding what is meant by undertaking a peace operation. This has led to terms being used loosely, even interchangeably, to identify a range of activities that can all be placed properly under the peace operation rubric, but that are considerably dissimilar in nature. The resulting confusion is significant because without rigorous criteria to define the individual components of peace operations, a consensus regarding what each activity legitimately entails, what risks each portends, what results each can be reasonably expected to produce, and what measures are appropriate to appraise each operation's success is virtually impossible to develop.¹² This problem is further compounded by individual elements that together comprise peace operations which are not dormant in their meaning. The activities each term is meant to represent have changed in the post-Cold War era.

These difficulties can be illustrated by looking at the evolving concept of peacekeeping. Traditional peacekeeping in the Cold War period typically contained three basic conditions that were established before the peacekeepers were inserted: fighting had ceased, parties to the dispute preferred peace to a continuation of the fighting, and the parties consented to the presence of the peacekeepers. Moreover, the conflict usually consisted of two or more states fighting primarily over territory. By adhering to these basic conditions, peacekeeping was presumed to proceed impartially, to act in an essentially benign atmosphere, to maintain a presence in a discretely demarcated piece of territory, to separate forces who clearly belonged to and were under the control of state actors, and to avoid interference in the internal affairs of host governments.¹³

While these conditions allowed peacekeeping to proceed in a largely straightforward manner in most cases, considerable controversy exists over peacekeeping in contemporary international politics:

- The mission has taken on new responsibilities. As defined by UN Secretary General Boutros-Ghali, "the nature of peacekeeping operations has evolved rapidly in recent years," resulting in an "increase and broadening of the tasks of peacekeeping operations" in the post-Cold War era.¹⁴ Provisions that had defined peacekeeping previously no longer capture its new features adequately.
- The type of conflicts peacekeeping involves has changed. In recent years, peacekeepers have been placed primarily in civil wars where traditional terms for

their employment have been much more difficult to arrange.¹⁵ During civil wars, control of territory is often the by-product of a more fundamental contest over the domestic political authority structure of the state where the conflict is occurring. A territorial *status quo ante*, which can be used in inter-state wars to crystallize the peacekeeping mission and to site peacekeepers, is not available. Fighting in a civil war is much more amorphous in terms of its participants, conduct, purpose, and objectives. As a result, obtaining assurances that all parties to the conflict approve of the peacekeeping mission, that all forces involved in the fighting can be controlled by their leaders, that the operating environment will be benign, and that the peacekeepers will avoid influencing the internal affairs of the affected state become significantly harder to achieve.

- Finally, another role that has emerged under the peacekeeping banner is the "humanitarian" mission to save populations from catastrophe, for example, famine. Under these circumstances, the requisite conditions for the mission to proceed are also not easy to arrange and maintain. This is especially true in this situation because central government authority is either weak or nonexistent.¹⁶

The problems created by uncertainties over the boundaries and internal divisions of peacekeeping operations are considerable. Without generally accepted criteria of evaluation, the entire mission becomes defined by the most recent example of its purported use, regardless of the nature or representativeness of the example. Thus, civil war in the former Yugoslavia, relief operations in Somalia, and the aborted peacekeeping mission in Haiti have become the substantive frames of reference in the current US policy debate over peacekeeping. Former Defense Secretary Les Aspin noted, for example, "Given the experience of crises in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti, there is considerable debate over whether, when, or how the United States, in the framework of the United Nations and other international organizations, should undertake peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations."¹⁷

Behind and beyond each of these crises, however, stands a longer past and a longer future that should form the basis of a durable and consistent US policy on peace operations. However, the excessive influence of present-day problems, revealed in Aspin's remarks, obscures a more constructive treatment of longer-term US interests and their realization. The situations in Bosnia,

Somalia, and Haiti do not fit the traditional peacekeeping model very well, nor are they necessarily emblematic of contemporary peacekeeping experiences. Somalia, for example, started out as a humanitarian operation and then segued, respectively, into a peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission.¹⁸ Yet, a lack of serious thinking about the evolving peace operation and its relationship to corresponding events allowed the adversity encountered in Somalia to be hyperbolized, thereby tainting all peacekeeping operations in the US policy debate and elevating the experience as a *cause celebre* in undermining the US commitment to the mission and the UN in general.¹⁹

With more sophisticated analysis and a more mature understanding of the complexities of peace operations, the US policy debate would no longer be driven by the fleeting presence of individual incidents. Instead of an episodic approach to devising a role for the United States in UN peace operations, a more comprehensive and integrated framework could be developed that transcends the vicissitudes of current events, discriminates between major policy choices, and focuses on longer-range goals to guide US behavior. In meeting the challenge of policy continuity in peace operations, the United States would exhibit more resilience in its commitment and steadiness in its purpose, and see beyond the discursive detours that now tortuously twist the US approach.

Peace Operations and US Interests

The framework described in the foregoing discussion works only if longer-range US goals peace operations can serve are established and maintained. Delineating this connection has also been hampered by uncertainties and contradictions. Publicly pronounced justifications for America's participation in peace operations reference Washington's overall commitment to peace and security throughout the international system, but specific linkages to individual policy goals are avoided. Such abstract principles are difficult to translate into concrete policy choices, however, especially when decisions involve the expenditure of US treasure and lives. As a result, guidelines that have been announced are more tautological than deductive in their reasoning, and they obscure rather than clarify the US perspective on this thorny policy issue.

National Security Advisor Anthony Lake's "rule" for US involvement in UN peace operations is indicative of this quandary. He stated in late 1993:

...there is one overriding factor for determining whether the United States should act multilaterally, and that is America's interests. The rule is very simple: we

should act multilaterally where doing so advances our interests, and we should shun multilateral action where it does not serve our interests.²⁰

While this argument is indisputably attentive to US interests, it is also bereft of any real meaning in establishing a framework that relates those interests to US policy choices on peace operations.

It is in some sense easier to associate peace operations with specific US policy goals through exclusion rather than inclusion. It is clear, for example, that peace operations are not connected with the pursuit of US vital interests in today's world. Several high-ranking public officials have drawn a sharp distinction between US vital interests and other national interests when describing the virtues of peace operations. The Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations, Ambassador Madeleine Albright, highlighted this difference in her remarks of late last year:

I would hope we would all agree that, although multilateral peacekeeping is a potentially valuable foreign policy tool, it cannot serve as a guarantor of our own vital interests, nor should it lessen our resolve to maintain vigorous regional alliances and a strong national defense. We want a stronger UN, but we are not about to substitute elusive notions of global collective security for battle-proven and time-tested concepts of unilateral and allied defense.²¹

If it clear that peace operations do not serve US vital interests, then the policy challenge becomes two-fold. One, to identify second-order national interests peace operations do promote. Two, to use these interests as a context within which to measure and validate the potential costs and risks in choosing whether or not to participate in peace operations. A dilemma, however, immediately becomes apparent. If vital interests are excluded as a measure of worth of peace operations, then costs justified on the basis of those interests are by definition too high to bear in the pursuit of lesser interests. Deciding which kinds and amounts of sacrifice are appropriate on behalf of second-order interests presents a particularly difficult policy question that the United States, thus far, has failed to answer.

As a consequence of severing the peace operation-vital interest linkage, US policy goals served by peace operations have been defined in only the broadest terms. Former Secretary of Defense Aspin provided a partial explanation in his 1994 "Annual Report to the President and the Congress":

These (regional) conflicts, while not posing direct threats to vital US interests, may nonetheless jeopardize important American interests in regional security and

in democracy and human rights. The cumulative impact of unchecked conflict and its ensuing human and economic costs will render more elusive the Administration's goal of enlarging the sphere of democratic, free-market states.²²

Ambassador Albright sounded a similar theme when she sought in late 1993 to justify US participation in UN peace operations:

Territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, civil wars, and the total collapse of governmental authority in some states are now among the principal threats to international peace and stability. Although many of these conflicts may not impinge directly on the national security interests of America or its allies, the cumulative effect of continuing conflict include economic dislocation, humanitarian disaster, terrorism and other forms of international lawlessness, regional political instability and the rise of leaders and societies that do not share our values. These problems can and do affect us.²³

Common elements appear in both of these statements. First, that peace operations can contribute to the dissemination of US values, which as any practitioner of *real politik* knows, can be differentiated from US interests. Second, the cumulative effect of regional conflicts, rather than their individual importance, detracts from US goals in international politics. Third, while regional conflicts do not directly threaten US national security interests, they pose "problems" that "can and do affect us."

Whether sufficient instructions from these proposals can be derived to choose courses of action and relate them to individual policy goals is doubtful. Numerous questions arise that must be answered before the decision-making process can proceed on US participation in peace operations.²⁴ What differences in terms of policy exist between the propagation of US values versus US interests? How can the cumulative effect of regional conflicts be measured to assess its rising significance for US goals? What distinctions should be drawn between problems and threats to US national security interests? How do these distinctions affect calculations of risk and cost across individual courses of action? These are only a sample of the issues that can be raised in constructing a US policy on peace operations. They need to be addressed before action can commence. Existing rationales, however, do not provide the answers.

In an effort to set US participation in peace operations on a more solid footing, the Secretary of Defense, in his 1994 "Annual Report," proposed a series of questions to form the basis of any decision to join in a UN peace operation.²⁵ The questions parallel those offered previously in the

Weinberger Doctrine to guide the commitment of US forces to hostilities overseas.²⁶ When considering the use of US forces in combat abroad, the Weinberger Doctrine recommended that vital interests be at stake and that victory and popular support be reasonably assured before any action is contemplated. Weinberger's criteria are not directly transferable to peace operations, but the influence of his standards are clearly represented in questions relating to US participation in UN efforts.

Of the questions presented, one can be examined that is of particular relevance to this discussion on US policy goals and peace operations, "Are the stakes or interests involved worth the risks to American military personnel?"²⁷ Historically, America's willingness to suffer casualties in its military forces has been strongly linked to securing its vital interests. The US heritage of isolationism was based firmly in concerns over American entrapment in European wars that were viewed as not involving our interests. Even when American forces were committed to combat overseas, the relationship between casualties and interests remained a primary determinant of public support for US policy. For example, mounting casualties and growing doubts about the criticality of US interests at stake created disenchantment with the wars in Korea and Vietnam.²⁸

Even greater constraints would be placed on US leaders who attempt to justify American casualties in UN peace operations by correlating them to US interests secured by the sacrifice.²⁹ There are three primary reasons for caution. First, in the current environment, sacrificing US lives in endeavors that do not promote vital interests simply is not sustainable over an extended period in terms of public or congressional support.³⁰ The precipitous decision to remove US forces from Somalia after modest but highly publicized casualties were sustained is indicative of this reaction. By excluding peace operations from serving US vital interests, America's leaders are compelled to plan such missions on the cheap out of concern that any sizable casualties will undermine support for the operation and force its abrupt termination.

Second, guarantees of a benign environment for the peace operation are more difficult to demonstrate convincingly given the changing nature of the mission. The past presumption of benign circumstances for peacekeeping operations, for example, was a powerful inducement to participate in those missions. The absence of vital interests in a crisis and the motive of compassion in one's offer of assistance, however, no longer guarantee a hospitable reception for

the peacekeepers. For the United States, nothing can compensate for the lack of vital interests in a peace operation except the conviction that the mission can be accomplished at close-to-zero cost in US lives within a very short period of time.

Third, the use of US forces to conduct peace operations carries with it the stigma that the mission is essentially military in nature and susceptible to a military solution. That peace operations are for the most part non-combat, non-traditional missions for US forces is not very well understood among the American public in terms of recognizing the complexities and limitations of these efforts.³¹ For example, the traditional use of military power to coerce an opponent through force of arms is not appropriate in most peace operations where preventing something from happening is often more important than compelling something to happen. Yet, reluctance to accept the notion that imposition of a military solution through the use of coercive force is not a feasible approach in most peace operations creates considerable frustration for a nation historically accustomed to resorting to such methods when its forces are engaged and something goes wrong, as it did in Somalia. The use of US forces in peace operations will continue to carry the seeds of misunderstanding about their duties unless a clearly defined distinction can be drawn and acknowledged regarding the nature of this mission compared to other tasks the military is expected to carry out.³²

A convincing paradigm has not been developed that relates US participation in peace operations to the advancement of American interests in global affairs. Without clearly articulated and persuasive principles to explain comprehensively the purpose and value of US participation in UN peace operations, US policies will continue to be characterized by indecision, spasmodic reactions, bewildering rules, confusing terminology, and highly perishable congressional and public will to undergird the US role. In addition, the debate over US policy toward peace operations will continue on its desultory path, leading to additional structural and behavioral impediments to action as a solution to the problem instead of a delineation of objectives, strategies, and techniques that define the US role in stable and resolute terms.³³

Making Progress in the Peace Operations Debate

The foregoing discussion suggests several steps that can be taken to encourage progress on resolving some of the problems that afflict the US approach to UN peace operations. The steps vary in their ambitiousness and difficulty, and none are free from controversy, but they all are

intended to ease the ongoing debate over a US role in peace operations and produce a policy that is consistent with the goals of the United Nations and American national security in the post-Cold War era.

- One, terminology in the peace operations debate must be regularized so that the boundaries and internal divisions of the mission can be clearly comprehended. In terms of the operational environment US forces will confront and the tasks they will be expected to carry out, it makes a big difference whether it is a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement mission. Just as Americans were taught the difference between the types of war their troops would be sent to fight in terms of their objectives and conduct (e.g., World War II v. Korea), the public must become knowledgeable about the types of peace operations US troops may be asked join. Clumsy use of terminology, however, both confuses the debate on peace operations and obscures an understanding of key components of the mission. A public educated about whether the United States is participating in a peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation in Bosnia, for example, is more likely to support US efforts as events unfold than if they are unclear about the nature of the mission.³⁴ If, on the other hand, the public remains unschooled in the complexities of peace operations, then its contribution to the debate on US participation will remain largely negative.
- Two, the United States must adopt a perspective on UN peace operations that transcends lurching reactively from one event to the next. To operate effectively in the international system, the United States must possess policy goals, strategies, and techniques that exhibit clarity of purpose, consistency of effort, and endurance of commitment. By developing an approach on peace operations that contains these features, the United States can offer both to the United Nations and to the American public policies that have greater legitimacy and predictability, and that can contribute significantly to plans for a more stable world order.
- Three, a policy framework must be established that links US participation in peace operations to discrete and concrete US policy goals. In addition, the links must be drawn in clearly recognizable and valid ways to remove uncertainties about the

reasons the United States decides to participate in UN peace operations. Without a strong foundation of interests to build peace operations upon, irresoluteness will continue to plague US efforts to develop and maintain a robust dedication to the UN mission.

- Four, the contradiction inherent in risking lives for lesser national interests must be resolved. It is both unreasonable and unfair to characterize peace operations as outside US vital interests and then to place US military lives at risk when participating in such missions. Since peace-enforcement operations pose the greatest probability for US troops to sustain and inflict casualties, perhaps this mission should only be undertaken when US vital interests are at stake. Other peace operation duties, such as peacekeeping, may be undertaken at a lower interest threshold because of the reduced risk of casualties. In either case, the risk of incurring casualties must be correlated against the interests at stake in a linear fashion. As the former goes up, so should the latter. An inability to define for the American public dissimilar peace operation missions based on the specific interests they serve and the potential casualties they risk almost guarantees that US policies will fail both in conception and implementation.
- Five, the unique characteristics of peace operations must be highlighted--both individually and comparatively--as a mission for US forces. The temptation to consider the mission as just another task along a continuum of duties for the US military distorts the role American troops are expected to play, the risks they confront, and the objectives they can be reasonably expected to accomplish. A potential way to accentuate the distinctive place peace operations occupy is to designate certain units within the US military as the primary force to carry them out.³⁵ This would follow the model established by Russia in appointing the 27th Motorized Rifle Division in the Volga Military District as a peace operations unit. Such units would retain their traditional military missions and could be reinforced by other units on an as-needed basis. Designating peace operation tasks as a special assignment for certain units would reinforce the belief that the task is

unique and cannot be conceived or handled in ways customary for other military tasks.

Adoption of these recommendations will not resolve all the disagreements about US participation in UN peace operations. The issues remain contentious, and continuing discussion on which policies are best for the UN mission and US interests is healthy. The above-mentioned steps will provide the debate with a progressive quality that is now lacking in many respects. They will furnish a more refined approach to the policy issues the United States faces in fashioning a role for itself in UN peace operations. If accepted, these proposals will more clearly differentiate peace operations by their nature and US policy options by their preferability. Decisions that result from this new approach should permit the United States to avoid the appearance of a gap between its words and deeds when it comes to supporting the perpetuation of peace and stability in the international system through participation in UN peace operations. That will take the United States a long way in demonstrating its leadership in the post-Cold War world.

Notes

¹ For a general assessment of America's need to reexamine its foreign and national security policies in the post-Cold War world, see, Robert E. Hunter, "Starting at Zero: US Foreign Policy for the 1990s," Washington Quarterly 15 (Winter 1992), pp. 27-42.

² See, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, "Empowering the United Nations," Foreign Affairs 71 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 90-108.

³ A comprehensive historical review of UN peace operations is contained in, *The Blue Helmets* (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1990).

⁴ William J. Durch, ed., *The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping* (New York: St. Martin's Press: 1993).

⁵ A discussion of the role of UN peacekeeping in this arena can be found in, John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," Washington Quarterly 11 (Winter 1991), pp. 207-219.

⁶ For a brief review of UN peacekeeping operations undertaken since 1988, see, "United Nations Peacekeeping Operations 1988-1993: Background Information," Congressional Research Service 93-993 F (November 15, 1993).

⁷ Not surprisingly, some question the wisdom of a more expansive role for the United Nations in peace operations. See, for example, Ernest W. Lefever, "Reining in the UN: Mistaking the Instrument for the Actor," Foreign Affairs (Summer 1993), pp. 17-20.

⁸ The changing role of the United Nations also has a significant effect on peace operations. See, Steven Metz, *The Future of the United Nations: Implications for Peace Operations* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993).

⁹ While this paper focuses on peace operations, numerous other techniques are available for the United Nations to use in promoting peace and security in the international system. For an exhaustively detailed look at these options, see, *Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes Between States*, (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1992).

¹⁰ Definitions for these and other terms are provided by the UN Secretary-General. See, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peacemaking, and Peacekeeping* (New York: UN Dept. of Public Information, 1992).

¹¹ For example, see, Stanley R. Sloan, "Peacekeeping and Conflict Management Activities: A Discussion of Terminology," Congressional Research Service 93-1017 S (November 26, 1993).

¹² A useful discussion of the different types of peace operations, especially peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, is contained in, Donald M. Snow, *Peacekeeping, Peacemaking and Peace-Enforcement: The US Role in the New International Order* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993).

¹³ Numerous examples of these conditions being fulfilled and a successful peacekeeping operation taking place occurred during the Cold War period. This does not mean that a settlement of the dispute was reached, as the prolonged presence of peacekeepers in places like India, Pakistan, and Cyprus attests. Nevertheless, as a valuable tool in obtaining and maintaining a cessation of armed conflict, the missions were judged as successful.

¹⁴ Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Peace*, p. 14.

¹⁵ For an analysis of this problem, see, Thomas G. Weiss, "New Challenges for UN Military Operations: Implementing an Agenda for Peace," Washington Quarterly 19 (Winter 1993), pp. 51-66.

¹⁶ Samuel W. Lewis, "Enhancing Stability: Peacemaking and Peacekeeping," in James R. Graham, ed. *Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 29-64.

¹⁷ Les Aspin, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1994), pp. 64-65.

¹⁸ The desperate conditions in Somalia, and the initial failure of the international community to assist in relieving the suffering are examined in, Jeffrey Clark, "Debacle in Somalia," Foreign Affairs 72 (Winter 1992/93), pp. 109-123.

¹⁹ As an example, see, Henry A. Kissinger, "Recipe for Chaos," The Washington Post (September 8, 1993), p. A32.

²⁰ Quoted in Aspin, *Annual Report*, p. 66.

²¹ Madeleine K. Albright, "Opening Statement Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," USUN Press Release 164-(93) (October 20, 1993) p. 4.

²² Aspin, *Annual Report*, p. 64.

²³ Albright, "Opening Statement," p. 5.

²⁴ The importance of establishing such a framework was emphasized by President Clinton in his address to the United Nations on September 27, 1993. He stated that the United Nations cannot become involved in every one of the world's conflicts and listed several questions that should be asked about proposals for new peacekeeping missions.

²⁵ Aspin, *Annual Report*, pp. 65-66.

²⁶ Discussed in Snow, *Peacekeeping*, pp. 17-18, 27.

²⁷ Aspin, *Annual Report*, p. 66.

²⁸ An excellent study of the relationship of casualties and public opinion to the conduct of the Korean and Vietnam Wars can be found in, John E. Mueller, *War, Presidents, and Public Opinion* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1985), pp. 23-65.

²⁹ One example of an adverse reaction to a president's decision to send US troops on a UN peace operation would be congressional invocation of the War Powers Resolution. For an analysis of this issue, see, Ellen C. Collier, "War Powers and UN Military Actions: A Brief Background of the Legislative Framework," Congressional Research Service 93-1058 F (December 21, 1993).

³⁰ Congressional support for US participation in UN peace operations would, of course, be crucial. See, Marjorie A. Browne, "United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service IB90103 (January 27, 1994).

³¹ Samuel P. Huntington, "Non-Traditional Roles for the US Military," in James R. Graham, ed., *Non-Combat Roles for the US Military in the Post-Cold War Era* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 3-14.

³² An examination of the unique military characteristics of UN peacekeeping operations can be found in, Richard Connaughton, "Command, Control, and Coalition Operations," in William H. Lewis, ed., *Military Implications of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1993), pp. 9-23.

³³ As an example of the former approach, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) has introduced a bill in the Senate entitled the "Peace Powers Act of 1994." It establishes some fairly elaborate rules that place significant limits on US participation in UN peace operations. It also mandates through various structural arrangements a full role for Congress in deployment and financing decisions. Dole discusses the bill in, Bob Dole, "Peacekeepers and Politics," The New York Times (January 24, 1994), p. A43.

³⁴ Civil war in the former Yugoslavia is a particularly complex and nasty affair. See, John Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, Adelphi Paper 270 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies) (Summer 1992).

³⁵ A discussion of the idea of activating Article 43 of the UN Charter and establishing a standing UN military force is contained in, Eugene V. Rostow, *Should Article 43 of the United Nations Charter be Raised from the Dead?* (Washington, D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1993).